[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Full-disclosure] Firewire Attack on Windows Vista

Hi Glenn,

> It should be realized though that fixing this is not necessarily a simple

> thing, nor are architectural considerations missing. 

I most probably understated the difficulty of implementing a safe
ieee1394 DMA driver earlier.  However, it's one of those things where
the drivers ought to at least default to a safe configuration and allow
those who like operating in the "wild west" for the purposes of speed to
do so.

> As for what can be done by Windows (as opposed to "any OS"), that is perhaps

> limited by the great range of underlying hardware. A compromise which might allow

> DMA to/from disks, tapes, or CDs but disallow it for most other peripherals

> might turn out to be the best general solution available, or something 

> comparably ugly.

In the specific case of FireWire, Windows already does this, but that is
exactly how the restrictions were bypassed.  You can't trust a disk
device any more than any other device, since a laptop can simply emulate
a storage device.