[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

n.runs-SA-2010.001 - Alcatel-Lucent - unauthenticated administrative access to CTI CCA Server



n.runs AG
http://www.nruns.com/                                security(at)nruns.com
n.runs-SA-2010.001                                       20-September-2010
____________________________________________________________________________

Vendor:             Alcatel
Affected Products:  Versions before 9.0.8.4 of the CCAgent option of 
			OmniTouch Contact Center Standard Edition
Vulnerability:      unauthenticated administrative access to CTI CCA Server 
Risk:               High 
CVE-Number:		CVE-2010-3279 (unauthenticated maintenance access)
			and CVE-2010-3280 (user credentials disclosure)
____________________________________________________________________________

Vendor communication:
  2010/02/16    initial information to Alcatel-Lucent from n.runs AG
  2010/02/16    initial response from Alcatel-Lucent to investigate 
                responsibility within Alcatel-Lucent group
  2010/02/18    request from Alcatel-Lucent about former vendor
communication
  2010/02/18    response given to n.runs at the end of 2009 from a customer
		   that requested n.runs to take over the handling of the 
		   vulnerability and to publish it.
  2010/02/24    confirmation from Alcatel-Lucent that vulnerability exists
  2010/03/15    n.runs confirms CVSS rating
  2010/08/10    Alcatel-Lucent confirms that vulnerability is fixed
		   (fix date: 2010/06/08)
  2010/08/23    Alcatel-Lucent proposes September 15th as the publication
date
		   and request CVE number
  2010/09/13    Business Parters of Alcatel-Lucent are informed about the 
		   vulnerability				
  2010/09/15    CVE numbers received
  2010/09/20	   n.runs AG releases this advisory
 
____________________________________________________________________________

Overview:
--------
Alcatel offers a CTI Solution for Call Centers. Call-Center Agents can log
on 
to the central CCA-Server with a helper client and can redirect calls from
their
call center extension to a normal phone even while they are out of office.

Description:
--------
Besides the tracking and managing of all connected agents with their
computers 
and phones, the server also has remote management and debugging facilities
for 
administrators.

For the administration of the server the same tcp/ip ports are used for the
registration of the out of office call center agents.

In addition there is no real authentication taking place. A tool called
"Tsa_Maintainance.exe" that ships with the product, can be used to view the 
debugging functions and status of the call center without any
authentication.
This way every call center agent can monitor the entire call-center, 
co-workers, can trace lines, deregister lines, etc...

Further investigation showed that there is authentication available but 
it is implemented in the wrong way. In a normal setup, the client is sending
the 
credentials to the server for verification. 
The ALCATEL WAY of user authentication is that the client verifies if 
authentication was successful. The call center agent server is sending the 
administrative password to the client in order to enable the client to 
decide to go on to the administrative functions or not.  
Therefore it is trivial to patch the client software to pass the
authentication.  
Furthermore with every "authentication" attempt to the server the attacker 
gains knowledge of the administrative password.

The password for the "SuperUser" is sent from the TSA server to the client
in 
cleartext in the following way:

Name=SuperUser  Password=072 175 173 176 173 177 181

Well, it is exacrly as it appears above. It is the "SuperUser"'s account
name and 
password, which is somehow obfuscated. The first number (72) is the offset
of 
the rest of numbers to the ascii decimal representation of the password
character. 

175 - 72 =  103 == g
173 - 72 =  101 == e
...

The above password in cleartext is called "geheim" (german for: secret)

This password authentication scheme is an epic failure in terms of design.

Impact:
--------
The problems described allow an attacker to basically do whatever he or she 
wants to with the call-center. From monitoring to completely reconfiguring 
it and disrupting service. Everything is possible.

Solution
--------
Workaround
Disable the maintenance access:
-	On the TSA server: disable the TSA maintenance access in the server
configuration file.

Mitigation
Implement segregation of roles:
-	Agent workstations should not propose the manager's client
application (TSA_manager.exe). Remove it if found.
-	Manager workstations should only propose the manager's client
application and not the agent client application.
-	Use a separate IP subnet to host the manager workstations.
-	Provide physical protection to manager workstations by implementing
physical access control to the room where the Contact Center managers have
their workstations.
Protect credential exchanged over the LAN:
-	Configure IPsec on the TSA server to require mandatory IPsec access
from an explicit list of management workstations.
-	Configure the Windows firewall to allow cleartext accesses from an
explicit list of agent workstations and drop all packets from any other
workstations.
Fixed Software Versions/Patches and how to obtain them
CCAgent version 7.1 and before are no longer supported. Users must upgrade
to the most recent CCAgent version.
________________________________________________________________________

Credits:
Bug found by Axel Rengstorf of Bluebox Security and Florian Walther of
n.runs AG.
________________________________________________________________________

References:
This Advisory and Upcoming Advisories:
http://www.nruns.com/security_advisory.php
________________________________________________________________________

About n.runs:
n.runs AG is a vendor-independent consulting company specialising in the
areas of: IT Infrastructure, IT Security and IT Business Consulting. 

Copyright Notice:
Unaltered electronic reproduction of this advisory is permitted. For all
other reproduction or publication, in printing or otherwise, contact
security@xxxxxxxxx for permission. Use of the advisory constitutes
acceptance for use in an "as is" condition. All warranties are excluded.
In no event shall n.runs be liable for any damages whatsoever including
direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, loss of business profits or
special damages, even if n.runs has been advised of the possibility of
such damages.

Copyright 2010 n.runs AG. All rights reserved. Terms of use apply.