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Multiple vulnerabilities in several IP camera products

Multiple vulnerabilities in several IP camera products

Title:		Multiple vulnerabilities in several IP camera products
Release date: 	08/06/2011
Last update: 	08/06/2011
Credits: 	Roberto Paleari, Emaze Networks S.p.A (roberto.paleari@xxxxxxxxx)

Class: 	       Hidden functionalities, command-injection, weak encryption

The vulnerabilities described in this advisory are related to a firmware shared
among several devices of different vendors. Unfortunately, we have not been
able to identify the actual firmware manufacturer: we asked the name of the
firmware manufacturer to the vendors, without any success (see section
"DISCLOSURE TIME-LINE" for details).

We confirm the products of the following vendors are affected:
   * TRENDnet
   * Digicom
   * iPUX

We speculate some IP camera products of the following vendors are also
   * ZoneNet
   * AirLink101

Other products we are not aware of could also be vulnerable to these issues.

The firmware running on the affected IP cameras is subject to multiple security
issues that allow an attacker to gain administrative access to the device and
to execute arbitrary commands. In the following paragraphs we describe the
details of the vulnerabilities we identified.

a) Undocumented user
   A user can authenticate to the web server running on the device using the
   credentials "productmaker:ftvsbannedcode". The "productmaker" user can
   access to a restricted number of web pages (basically, all the pages under
   the "/cgi/maker/" directory).

b) Command-injection vulnerabilities
   Some of the web pages the "productmaker" can access to are subject to a
   command-injection vulnerability, as the server-side script does not properly
   validate user-supplied input.

   The following URL exploits a command-injection vulnerability inside
   "unittest.cgi" page. The payload executes the "ls" command and displays
   its output inside the generated web page:

   http://<device IP address>/cgi/maker/unittest.cgi?action=asd;ls;date>/dev/null 

   A similar issue also affects the "sn.asp" page.

c) Hidden Telnet service
   The "productmaker" user can enable a Telnet server by accessing the
   following web page:

   http://<device IP address>/cgi/maker/tools.cgi?telnet=1

   The page spawns a Telnet daemon listening on TCP port 23. The Telnet daemon
   does not require any authentication.

d) Weak password encryption
   User passwords are stored in "/server/usr.ini", and are simply encoded in
   base64 form.

e) Configuration encoding
   Users can backup the configuration of the device through the web
   interface. The configuration is saved in a tgz file ("config.cfg") that is
   "encrypted" in a easy-to-reverse form. The following Python procedure
   decodes the "encrypted" version of the configuration file:

   # 'data' is the content of the encrypted configuration file, as downloaded
   # from the web interface
   def conf_decode(data):
       r = ""
       for c in data:
       	   x = ord(c) ^ ord('j')
	   x = (~x) & 0xff
	   r += chr(x)
       return r

    To encode a plain tgz file into a valid configuration archive, just apply
    the inverse of the "conf_decode" procedure.

By leveraging the aforementioned vulnerabilities, an attacker can easily obtain
the authentication credentials for the "admin" user as follows:

1. Authenticate as the hidden "productmaker" user.
2. Exploit the command-injection vulnerability to obtain the content of the
   /server/usr.ini file.
3. The web server replies with the password for the "admin" user, encoded in

We are not aware of an updated firmware that corrects the issues described in
this advisory.  In the meanwhile, users can modify the default credentials for
the user "productmaker", in order to inhibit unauthorized accesses to the

At this aim, users should perform the following actions: 

1. Perform a backup of the configuration of the device.
2. Decode the configuration file (see point 'e' in the previous section).
3. Modify the config/server/usr.ini file inside the tgz archive, and replace
   the password for the "maker" user with a new one.
4. Rebuild the tgz archive and encode it.
5. Upload the new configuration file to the device.

A Python script that automates these steps can be provided upon request.

We tried to contact two different vendors. Below we report the time-lines:

    * 07/03/2011 - The author contacts vendor A, asking for details about the
      		   firmware manufacturer.
    * 07/03/2011 - First reply from vendor A, asking for vulnerability
    * 08/03/2011 - The author informed vendor A about his intention to
      		   publicly disclose the details of the security issues after
      		   the release of proper countermeasures.
    * 16/03/2011 - No response from the vendor. The author re-sent the previous
    * 29/03/2011 - Still no reply from the vendor. The author re-sent the
                   e-mail again.
    * 21/04/2011 - Again, no reply from the vendor. The author re-sent the
    * 08/06/2011 - Disclosure.

    * 06/06/2011 - The author contacts vendor B, asking for details about the
      		   firmware manufacturer.
    * 06/06/2011 - Vendor B replies he is not interested into fixing these
      		   security issues.
    * 07/06/2011 - The author informs vendor B about his intention to disclose
      		   the details of the issues.
    * 08/06/2011 - Disclosure.

Copyright(c) Emaze Networks S.p.A 2011, All rights reserved worldwide.
Permission is hereby granted to redistribute this advisory, providing that no
changes are made and that the copyright notices and disclaimers remain intact.

Emaze Networks has updated ipLegion, its vulnerability assessment platform, to
check for this vulnerability. Contact info@xxxxxxxxx to have more information
about ipLegion.

Emaze Networks S.p.A is not responsible for the misuse of the information
provided in our security advisories. These advisories are a service to the
professional security community. There are NO WARRANTIES with regard to this
information. Any application or distribution of this information constitutes
acceptance AS IS, at the user's own risk. This information is subject to change
without notice.