[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Full-disclosure] Apache suEXEC privilege elevation / information disclosure

Am 12.08.2013 19:28, schrieb Coderaptor:
> I have been a silent spectator to this drama, and could not resist adding a few thoughts of my own:
> All software, especially webservers, should ship with secure defaults

yes, but define secure defaults without a context
hint: you can't

> It is a fundamental mistake to assume all admins who roll out web apps and 
> maintain servers RTFM before rolling out

it is a fundamental mistake not doing so and be admin

> 2. Apache clearly does not ship with secure defaults in favor of convenience? 
> disable_functions is a example 

disable_functions has *nothing* to do with Apache because it is a php option
apache itself *does not* create symlinks at all

> do you expect an admin to be a unix expert or know what each parameter in there means?

*yes* *yes* and *yes* again

> Why not enable_functions instead, with everything disabled to begin with? 
> (Oh, that wouldn't help you achieve world dominance and fast!)

another example that people with no clue make proposals

there you go: http://www.php.net/manual/en/funcref.php
come on, list all functions except the one i listed

*Again*: Apache does not create any symlink
Apache does only *follow*

so what should suExec do for you if you are refuse to understand what
the different software-layers are supposed to do and why different
layers exist at all and finally how to manage all of them?

so disable follow symlinks in Apache or disable potential dangerous functions
in scripting languages - and since Apache can not control any low level
function a scripting language is using and symlinks are not the only
dangerous thing you should do *both* or not play admin

this thread is a good example that lazy admins are dreaming about rollout a
powerful *and* secure service with default configurations and this naive
attitude is only possible by beeing completly clueless, if one would
understand the underlying tech he would no longer dream of flying horses

> On Aug 11, 2013, at 3:30 PM, Reindl Harald <h.reindl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Am 11.08.2013 23:56, schrieb Stefan Kanthak:
>>> "Reindl Harald" <h.reindl@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>> again:
>>>> symlinks are to not poision always and everywhere
>>>> they become where untrusted customer code is running
>>>> blame the admin which doe snot know his job and not
>>>> the language offering a lot of functions where some
>>>> can be misused
>>> Again: symlinks are well-known as attack vector for years!
>> and that's why any admin which is not clueless
>> disables the symlink function - but there exists
>> code which *is* secure, runs in a crontrolled
>> environment and make use of it for good reasons
>>> It's not the user/administrator who develops or ships insecure code!
>> but it's the administrator which has the wrong job if
>> create symlinks is possible from any random script
>> running on his servers
>> anyways, i am done with this thread
>> the topic is *not* "Apache suEXEC privilege elevation" it
>> is "admins not secure their servers" - period

Attachment: signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature