[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: %windir%\temp\sso\ssoexec.dll (or: howtrustworthy is Microsoft's build process)
This is a followup to <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Mar/17>
On Sunday, March 04, 2012 9:06 PM I wrote:
> Hi @ll,
> the system image "\Setup\WIM\setup.wim" on the "POSReady 2009 eval CD",
> available from the Microsoft Download Center under
> contains the following registry entries:
> [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\SSOExec]
> To complete the picture: the ACLs on the directory "%windir%\temp" in
> systems installed from this image/CD allow unprivileged users to create
> a subdirectory "sso" in "%windir%\temp" and then the "ssoexec.dll",
> allowing them to have their code run under every (other) user account
> used to log on afterwards, resulting in a privilege escalation.
After I learned that the same vulnerability exists in EVERY installation
of Windows Embedded POSReady 2009 I contacted a vendor and Microsoft
The vendor got the following reply from Microsoft:
| The Microsoft Windows Embedded Product team, along with the MSRC
| (Microsoft Security Response Center) team researched this in early
| 2012 and determined that this is a not a vulnerability because
| Microsoft Malware Protection Center does not consider this to be
OUCH! How absurd!
| It was determined that these keys came from XP Embedded and
| the Standard Windows Logon Component. They found no evidence of
| malware on our build systems and the presence of the keys is not
| an indication that malware was ever present on the systems
There is no file "ssoexec.dll" in Windows Embedded POSReady 2009!
As far as I know there is no file by this name in ANY version/variant
I requested clarification about these absurd statements and whether
a hotfix will be provided from the MSRC <secure@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> and
got the following answer:
| Could you explain how the EOP attack works using this DLL?
| Normal users don't have write permission to %windir%, and if an
| attacker controls an Administrator account then they've already
| defeated security.
to which I replied:
| The directory in question is but "%windir%\temp\"!
| In Windows Embedded POSReady 2009 UNPRIVILEGED users can create
| the subdirectory "sso\" and the DLL "ssoexec.dll".
| Game over!
which yield another absurd answer from the MSRC:
| After some research, it appears this EOP attack requires that the
| attacker has already violated one of the 10 Immutable Laws of Security
| (http://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc722487.aspx ), most notably
| laws #1 or #3. You should read the article to understand why those
| laws matter.
OUCH! I asked the MSRC again:
| which part of "In Windows Embedded POSReady 2009 UNPRIVILEGED users
| can create the subdirectory "sso\" and the DLL "ssoexec.dll" is not
and got the final answer:
| We are aware of the issues and arguments you've mentioned. An attacker
| in a position to carry out these attacks could also carry out many
| other attacks we can't stop. The link provided below explains this in