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SEC Consult SA-20140716-3 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in Bitdefender GravityZone

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SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20140716-3 >
              title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities
            product: Bitdefender GravityZone
 vulnerable version: <
      fixed version: >=
             impact: critical
           homepage: http://www.bitdefender.com
              found: 2014-05-22
                 by: Stefan Viehböck
                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

Vendor description:
- -------------------
Bitdefender GravityZone lets enterprises control and protect the heterogeneous
environments of today. The solution combines highly optimized virtualization
aware security with leading detection technologies and a fresh, but proven,
architecture. It empowers administrators with features adapted to reduce the
daily security hassle and eliminate the need for point solutions with unified
protection across virtualized, physical, and mobile endpoints. Unlike other
solutions that bolt-on modules to an aging architecture, the GravityZone
Control Center dashboard has been designed specifically to unify monitoring
and security management in a single simple and accessible interface.


Business recommendation:
- ------------------------
Attackers are able to completely compromise the Bitdefender GravityZone
solution as they can gain system and database level access.
Furthermore attackers can manage all endpoints.

The Bitdefender GravityZone can be used as an entry point into the target
infrastructure (lateral movement, privilege escalation).

It is highly recommended by SEC Consult not to use this software until a
thorough security review has been performed by security professionals and all
identified issues have been resolved.

Vulnerability overview/description:
- -----------------------------------
1) Unauthenticated local file disclosure (Web Console, Update Server)
Unauthenticated users can read arbitrary files from the filesystem with the
privileges of the "nginx" operating system user. These files include
configuration files containing sensitive information such as clear text
passwords which can be used in further attacks.

Separate vulnerabilities affecting both Web Console and Update Server were

2) Insecure service configuration / design issues
The MongoDB database which is offered via the network by default (TCP ports
27017, 28017) can be accessed using hardcoded credentials which can't be
changed. The overall system design requires the database to be accessible via
the network.
All relevant GravityZone configuration data can be accessed and changed. This
includes the user table.

Excerpt from the documentation describing the TCP port 27017:
"Default port used by the Communication Server and Control Center to access
the Database."

3) Missing authentication
Authentication is not required for certain scripts in the web UI. This
allows unauthenticated attackers to execute administrative functions without
prior authentication.

Proof of concept:
- -----------------
1) Unauthenticated local file disclosure (Web Console, Update Server)
Arbitrary files can be downloaded via a vulnerable script:

The Update Server is vulnerable to local file disclosure as well. Arbitrary
files can be downloaded using the following HTTP request:

GET /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
Host: <host>:7074

2) Insecure service configuration / Design issues
Attackers can connect to MongoDB on TCP ports 27017 and 28017 using the
following hardcoded credentials:
Username: <removed>
Password: <removed>

Detailed proof of concept exploits have been removed for this vulnerability.

3) Missing authentication
Authentication is not required for the following script:
/webservice/CORE/downloadSignedCsr (Unauthenticated certificate upload)

Vulnerable / tested versions:
- -----------------------------
The vulnerabilities have been verified to exist in GravityZone,
which was the most recent version at the time of discovery.

Vendor contact timeline:
- ------------------------
2014-05-26: Sending responsible disclosure policy and requesting encryption
2014-05-26: Vendor responds providing encryption keys.
2014-05-26: Sending advisory and proof of concept exploit via encrypted
2014-05-26: Vendor confirms receipt.
2014-06-04: Requesting status update.
2014-06-14: Vendor provides status update. Update will be released "End of
2014-06-26: Vendor provides status update. Update for issue #1 and #3 will
            be released June 30. Update for issue #2 will be released at the
			end of July.
2014-06-27: Requesting info about other affected products. Clarifying
            disclosure of issue #2.
2014-07-09: Vendor confirms that update for issue #1 and #3 has been shipped
            and KB article for issue #2 will be released.
2014-07-15: Requesting version numbers of affected products.
2014-07-16: SEC Consult releases coordinated security advisory.

- ---------
Update to a more recent version of Bitdefender GravityZone _and_
implement mitigations for the issue #2.

More information can be found at:

- -----------
No workaround available.

Advisory URL:
- -------------

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

SEC Consult
Vienna - Bangkok - Frankfurt/Main - Montreal - Singapore - Vilnius

Mooslackengasse 17, 1190 Vienna, Austria
Phone:   +43 1 8903043 0
Fax:     +43 1 8903043 15

Mail: research at sec-consult dot com
Web: https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog: http://blog.sec-consult.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

EOF Stefan Viehböck / @2014
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