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CSIRTUK ADVISORY - 3275 - OpenPKG - Security Advisory BIND
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CSIRTUK ADVISORY - 3275 dated 26.07.07 time 16:00
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
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Title
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OpenPKG Bind Security Advisory
Detail
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OpenPKG Bind Security Advisory
ID: 3275
Date: 26 July 2007 12:17
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Title: OpenPKG Bind Security Advisory
Abstract: The default access control lists (acls) are not being correctly set,
as a result, anyone can make recursive queries and/or query the cache
contents. In addition, the DNS query id generation is vulnerable to
cryptographic analysis which provides a 1 in 8 chance of guessing the next
query id for 50% of the query ids. This can be used to perform cache poisoning
by an attacker.
Vendors affected:OpenPKG
Applications affected:Bind
Advisory type: Information
Warning Status: Information only
Potential Damage: Remote unauthorised modification
Availability of fix: Available
Type of fix: Patch
Source: OpenPKG
Reliability of source: Trusted
Source URL: http://www.openpkg.com/security/advisories/OpenPKG-SA-2007.022.html
CVE: CVE-2007-2925, CVE-2007-2926
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Hash: SHA1
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Publisher Name: OpenPKG GmbH
Publisher Home: http://openpkg.com/
Advisory Id (public): OpenPKG-SA-2007.022
Advisory Type: OpenPKG Security Advisory (SA)
Advisory Directory: http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA
Advisory Document: http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA-2007.022
Advisory Published: 2007-07-25 12:18 UTC
Issue Id (internal): OpenPKG-SI-20070725.01
Issue First Created: 2007-07-25
Issue Last Modified: 2007-07-25
Issue Revision: 04
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Subject Name: bind
Subject Summary: DNS Server
Subject Home: http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/
Subject Versions: 9.* <= 9.4.1-P1
Vulnerability Id: CVE-2007-2925, CVE-2007-2926
Vulnerability Scope: global (not OpenPKG specific)
Attack Feasibility: run-time
Attack Vector: remote network
Attack Impact: privilege escalation
Description:
As confirmed [0] by the vendor, two vulnerabilities exist in the DNS
server BIND [1]:
1. The default access control lists (acls) are not being correctly
set. If not set anyone can make recursive queries and/or query the
cache contents.
2. The DNS query id generation is vulnerable to cryptographic
analysis which provides a 1 in 8 chance of guessing the next query
id for 50% of the query ids. This can be used to perform cache
poisoning by an attacker. This bug only affects outgoing queries,
generated by BIND 9 to answer questions as a resolver, or when it is
looking up data for internal uses, such as when sending NOTIFYs to
slave name servers.
References:
[0] http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/bind-security.php
[1] http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/
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Primary Package Name: bind
Primary Package Home: http://openpkg.org/go/package/bind
Corrected Distribution: Corrected Branch: Corrected Package:
OpenPKG Community CURRENT bind-9.4.1p1-20070725
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For security reasons, this document was digitally signed with the OpenPGP
public key of the OpenPKG GmbH (public key id 61B7AE34) which you can download
from http://openpkg.com/openpkg.com.pgp
or retrieve from the OpenPGP keyserver at hkp://pgp.openpkg.org/.
Follow the instructions at http://openpkg.com/security/signatures/
for more details on how to verify the integrity of this document.
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