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CSIRTUK ADVISORY - 3424 - Cisco - IOS Line Printer Daemon (LPD) Protocol Stack Overflow
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CSIRTUK ADVISORY - 3424 dated 11.10.07 time 10:51
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)
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Title
=====
Cisco IOS Line Printer Daemon (LPD) Protocol Stack Overflow
Detail
======
ID: 3424
Date: 11 October 2007 10:51
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------
Title: 3424 - Cisco IOS Line Printer Daemon (LPD) Protocol Stack
Overflow
Abstract: The Line Printer Daemon, which provides print server
functionality in Cisco IOS is vulnerable to a software flaw whereby the
length of the hostname of the router is not checked before being copied
into a fixed size memory buffer. This results in IOS crashing if the
hostname is too long, but could potentially result is arbitrary code
execution.
Vendors affected:Cisco
Operating Systems affected: IOS
Applications affected:Line Printer Daemon (LPD)
Advisory type: Information
Potential Damage: Remote unauthorised modification
Availability of fix: Available
Type of fix: Work around
Source: Cisco
Reliability of source: Trusted
Source URL:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20071010-lpd.shtml
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Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Response: Cisco IOS Line Printer Daemon (LPD) Protocol
Stack Overflow
Document ID: 99109
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20071010-lpd.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2007 October 10 1600 UTC (GMT)
- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
Cisco Response
==============
This is the Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT)
response to an issue discovered and reported to Cisco by Andy Davis from
IRM, Plc. regarding a stack overflow in the Cisco IOS Line Printer
Daemon (LPD) Protocol feature. The original post is available at the
following link:
http://www.irmplc.com/index.php/155-Advisory-024
Cisco greatly appreciates the opportunity to work with researchers on
security vulnerabilities, and welcome the opportunity to review and
assist in product reports.
Additional Information
======================
Cisco has confirmed the security research's findings and has documented
this issue in Cisco Bug ID CSCsj86725.
All versions of IOS that support the LPD functionality except the ones
listed below are affected. Customers that do not enable the LPD
functionality are not affected.
Note: LPD is disabled by default on Cisco IOS routers.
If LPD services are configured, then one or more global printer <name>
command lines would be present in the router's configuration.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this
vulnerability.
This issue has been fixed on versions 12.2(18)SXF11, 12.4(16a),
12.4(2)T6 and later. For more information please view the bug's details
via the Bug Toolkit on Cisco.com.
Workaround
==========
If LPD services are not required, they can be disabled by using the no
printer command; thus, eliminating this vulnerability.
Note: LPD is disabled by default on Cisco IOS routers.
In addition, LPD uses TCP port 515. An access control list (ACL) can be
configured to only allow trusted devices to communicate to the router
via TCP port 515.
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT
YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2007-October-10 | public |
| | | release. |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_poli
cy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
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