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CSIRTUK ADVISORY - 3432 - Cisco - Unified Communications Web-based Management Vulnerability
CSIRTUK ADVISORY - 3432 dated 17.10.07 time 22:48
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)
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Cisco Unified Communications Web-based Management Vulnerability
Date: 17 October 2007 22:48
Title: 3432 - Cisco Unified Communications Web-based Management
Abstract: Unified Contact Center and Intelligent Contact Management
products contain a vulnerability that may result in unauthorized access
to the web-based reporting and script monitoring tool (Web View) and the
web-based configuration tool (Web Admin).
Applications affected:Unified Contact Center and Intelligent Contact
Advisory type: Information
Potential Damage: Remote unauthorised modification
Availability of fix: Available
Type of fix: Patch
Reliability of source: Trusted
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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Unified Communications Web-based
Document ID: 97836
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20071017-IPCC
For Public Release 2007 October 17 1600 UTC (GMT)
Unified Contact Center and Intelligent Contact Management products
contain a vulnerability that may result in unauthorized access to the
web-based reporting and script monitoring tool (Web View) and the
web-based configuration tool (Web Admin).
This advisory is posted at
The following products are affected by a vulnerability that may result
in unauthorized access to the web-based reporting and script monitoring
tool (Web View):
* Cisco Unified Intelligent Contact Management Enterprise (Unified
* Cisco Unified ICM Hosted (Unified ICMH)
* Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise (UCCE)
* Cisco Unified Contact Center Hosted (UCCH)
* Cisco System Unified Contact Center Enterprise (SUCCE)
The following product is affected by a vulnerability that may result in
unauthorized access to the web-based configuration tool (Web Admin).
* Cisco System Unified Contact Center Enterprise (SUCCE)
To determine the version of software installed on the Administration
Workstation (AW), navigate to the Add or Remove Programs window on the
Windows Server. If impacted, an entry for Cisco ICM Maintenance Release
ICM 7.1(5) will be observable in the list of installed applications.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
The following products are not affected by the vulnerability described
in this document:
* Cisco Unified Contact Center Express
* Cisco IP Contact Center Express
No other Cisco products are known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Only the identified products running software version ICM 7.1(5) are
impacted by this vulnerability.
Cisco Unified ICME, Unified ICMH, UCCE, UCCH and SUCCE are a suite of
strategic platforms that enable customers to provide intelligent routing
and call treatment with blending of multiple communication channels.
A vulnerability exists in software version 7.1(5) for Cisco Unified
ICME, Unified ICMH, UCCE, UCCH and SUCCE editions that may enable any
Windows Active Directory domain defined user to obtain unauthorized
privilege levels. This would provide Windows Active Directory users the
ability to view Web View report information for any call center
instance. Cisco SUCCE is also impacted by unauthorized access to the Web
Admin tool, which could result in the ability to change the application
configuration, including editing application rights.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID: CSCsj55686
Vulnerability Scoring Details
Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in
this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute
environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.
CVSS is a standards based scoring method that conveys vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the
environmental impact for individual networks at:
CSCsj55686 - AD users have privileges to log into Web View and Web Admin
CVSS Base Score - 9
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability described in this document
may provide any user defined in the Windows Active Directory domain with
unauthorized access to view Web View information for any ICM or Contact
Center instance. In addition, the vulnerability provides unauthorized
access to the Web Admin tool for any user defined in the Windows Active
Directory domain. It should be noted that Web Admin is only used with
Cisco SUCCE. Access to Web Admin may result in the ability to change the
application configuration, including editing application rights.
Software Versions and Fixes
When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.
| Software | Patch | Maintenance |
| Release | | |
| | ICM7.1 | 7.2(3) |
| 7.1(5) | (5) | (Available |
| | _ES46 | December 2007) |
Contact Center and ICM maintenance software can be downloaded from the
Any Windows users defined in Active Directory that are not part of the
ICM/IPCC Active Directory hierarchy will have full access to the Web
View and Web Admin tools. There is no workaround. Users defined in the
Windows Active Directory domain where the IPCC servers reside and then
associated to the instance of the ICM/IPCC Active Directory hierarchy
will have correct permissions. Filters such as Transit ACLs can then be
used to allow access to the Administration Workstation from only the
Filters that deny HTTP packets using TCP port 80 and HTTPS packets using
TCP port 443 should be deployed throughout the network as part of a tACL
policy for protection of traffic that enters the network at ingress
access points. This policy should be configured to protect the network
device where the filter is applied and other devices behind it. Filters
for HTTP packets using TCP port 80 and HTTPS packets using TCP port 443
should also be deployed in front of vulnerable network devices so that
traffic is only allowed from trusted clients.
Additional information about tACLs is available in "Transit Access
Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge:
Additional mitigations that can be deployed on Cisco devices within the
network are available in the Cisco Applied Intelligence companion
document for this advisory:
Obtaining Fixed Software
Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software
becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult
their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set
compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using
such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of
Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
Do not contact "psirt@xxxxxxxxx" or "security-alert@xxxxxxxxx" for
Customers with Service Contracts
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix
is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is
Customers without Service Contracts
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service
contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are
unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale,
should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows:
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@xxxxxxxxx
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades
for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
Exploitation and Public Announcements
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer
Status of this Notice: FINAL
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT
YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits
the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy,
and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients:
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2007-Oct-17 | Public |
| | | Release |
Cisco Security Procedures
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
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CSIRTUK wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Cisco for the
contained in this advisory.
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