[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: Question regarding 2440:5.2.3.16



From: "L. Sassaman" <rabbi@quickie.net>
Subject: Question regarding 2440:5.2.3.16
Date: Fri, 7 Jul 2000 16:37:11 -0700 (PDT)
Message-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.21.QNWS_2.0007071630350.26405-100000@thetis.deor.org>

> In order for keyservers to take advantage of 2440:5.2.3.16, there must be
> a way to authenticate the user submitting the add as being the owner of
> the key.

so you are suggesting that proof of ownership of the corresponding
secret key (via an appropriate signature) should server this purpose,
right?

> This can be done quite easily using an LDAPS connection, but since most
> keyservers do not support such a connection, and some clients do not
> either, I think there should be a standard data format for submitting
> signed add requests to "HKP" keyservers.
> 
> Werner Koch and I have been discussing this, and he suggests that we put
> it into a clear-text signature packet. Would that be suitable? 

would you mind briefly describing the steps involved for the mechanism
you are considering (in terms like "first, the client connects to the
server.  then the server responds w/..." etc.)?  

[ i understand what you are saying about the form a signature would
take, but i don't see the overall flow of the process of
authentication. ]

also, is it necessary to consider replay attacks for this kind of
scenario?  alternatively, would the following scenario be of any concern:

  an attacker captures a session between a user and a keyserver at some
  point in time.  later, after the user has made several updates to the
  keyserver, the attacker replays the captured session to set the
  state of the user's key to an earlier state.