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Re: draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc2440bis-06.txt



On Tue, 2002-09-24 at 16:37, Derek Atkins wrote:
> [...]If the
> attacker controls the keyserver and can remove revocations then
> obviously this doesn't work, but I don't think an attacker can control
> that many data points.

Depending on the attack scenario, it might suffice when one person does
not see a revocation certificate during a limited timeframe (while they
send some vital documents encrypted to the compromised key).

This only requires control of the network connection of one machine for
a specific time. Absolutely feasible.

cheers
-- vbi

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