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Re: Plausible deniability (a feature to think about)





On Wed, 21 Sep 2005 21:29:55 -0700 "Daniel A. Nagy" 
<nagydani@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Now, 
>the
>receiving party can be sure that it was composed by the sender, 
>but has no
>means of proving it to a third party. The sender can plausibly 
>deny
>authorship, claiming that the receiver has forged it using his 
>private key
>and the sender's public key.

>Has anybody ever bothered implementing (or even designing an 
>implementation
>of) this in an OpenPGP-friendly manner? 

this can easily be accomplished now, 
within the existing standard, and existing implementations:

any two correspondents,
can simply make a third keypair, with a third name,
and each have the public and private signing and encrypting keys,

anything signed with the third key, authenticates only to the 
correspondents
where the receiver knows that the sender signed it,
but cannot be proved to any third party, 
other than the fact that any possessor of the signing key, signed 
it.

many variations of this are possible;

new signing subkeys, set to expire within hours of the message 
time,

split key systems with shares set to one, and split to only the 
receiver and sender keys, etc.


vedaal



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