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UNIRAS Brief - 471/05 - Gentoo - Three Security Advisories



 
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   UNIRAS (UK Govt CERT) Briefing Notice - 471/05 dated 23.06.05  Time: 15:30  
  UNIRAS is part of NISCC (National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre)
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  UNIRAS material is also available from its website at www.uniras.gov.uk and
         Information about NISCC is available from www.niscc.gov.uk
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Title
=====
Gentoo - Three Security Advisories:
     1.  Cacti: Several vulnerabilities    [GLSA 200506-20]
     2.  Trac: File upload vulnerability   [GLSA 200506-21]
     3.  sudo: Arbitrary command execution [GLSA 200506-22]


Detail
====== 

Security Advisory summaries:

     1.  Cacti is vulnerable to several SQL injection and file inclusion
         vulnerabilities.

     2.  Trac may allow remote attackers to upload files, possibly leading to
         the execution of arbitrary code.

     3.  sudo allows a system administrator to give users the ability to run
         commands as other users.

Security Advisory content follows:


1.


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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory                           GLSA 200506-20
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                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
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  Severity: High
     Title: Cacti: Several vulnerabilities
      Date: June 22, 2005
      Bugs: #96243
        ID: 200506-20

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Synopsis
========

Cacti is vulnerable to several SQL injection and file inclusion
vulnerabilities.

Background
==========

Cacti is a complete web-based frontend to rrdtool.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package             /  Vulnerable  /                   Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1  net-analyzer/cacti      < 0.8.6e                        >= 0.8.6e

Description
===========

Cacti fails to properly sanitize input which can lead to SQL injection
as well as PHP file inclusion.

Impact
======

An attacker could potentially exploit the file inclusion to execute
arbitrary code with the permissions of the web server. An attacker
could exploit the SQL injection to gain information from the database.
Only systems with register_globals set to "On" are vulnerable to the
file inclusion bugs. Gentoo Linux ships with register_globals set to
"Off" by default.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All Cacti users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=net-analyzer/cacti-0.8.6e"

Note: Users with the vhosts USE flag set should manually use
webapp-config to finalize the update.

References
==========

  [ 1 ] Cacti Release Notes
        http://www.cacti.net/release_notes_0_8_6e.php
  [ 2 ] iDEFENSE SQL injection advisory
        http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=267&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=false
  [ 3 ] iDEFENSE config_settings advisory
        http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=266&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=false
  [ 4 ] iDEFENSE remote file inclusion advisory
        http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=265&type=vulnerabilities&flashstatus=false

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200506-20.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@xxxxxxxxxx or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0



2.



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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory                           GLSA 200506-21
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                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
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  Severity: Normal
     Title: Trac: File upload vulnerability
      Date: June 22, 2005
      Bugs: #96572
        ID: 200506-21

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Synopsis
========

Trac may allow remote attackers to upload files, possibly leading to
the execution of arbitrary code.

Background
==========

Trac is a minimalistic web-based project management, wiki and bug
tracking system including a Subversion interface.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package        /  Vulnerable  /                        Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1  www-apps/trac       < 0.8.4                              >= 0.8.4

Description
===========

Stefan Esser of the Hardened-PHP project discovered that Trac fails to
validate the "id" parameter when uploading attachments to the wiki or
the bug tracking system.

Impact
======

A remote attacker could exploit the vulnerability to upload arbitrary
files to a directory where the webserver has write access to, possibly
leading to the execution of arbitrary code.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All Trac users should upgrade to the latest available version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=www-apps/trac-0.8.4"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] Hardened PHP Advisory 012005
        http://www.hardened-php.net/advisory-012005.php

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200506-21.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@xxxxxxxxxx or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0



3.



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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory                           GLSA 200506-22
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                                            http://security.gentoo.org/
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  Severity: Normal
     Title: sudo: Arbitrary command execution
      Date: June 23, 2005
      Bugs: #96618
        ID: 200506-22

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Synopsis
========

A vulnerability in sudo may allow local users to elevate privileges.

Background
==========

sudo allows a system administrator to give users the ability to run
commands as other users.

Affected packages
=================

    -------------------------------------------------------------------
     Package         /  Vulnerable  /                       Unaffected
    -------------------------------------------------------------------
  1  app-admin/sudo     < 1.6.8_p9                         >= 1.6.8_p9

Description
===========

The sudoers file is used to define the actions sudo users are permitted
to perform. Charles Morris discovered that a specific layout of the
sudoers file could cause the results of an internal check to be
clobbered, leaving sudo vulnerable to a race condition.

Impact
======

Successful exploitation would permit a local sudo user to execute
arbitrary commands as another user.

Workaround
==========

Reorder the sudoers file using the visudo utility to ensure the 'ALL'
pseudo-command precedes other command definitions.

Resolution
==========

All sudo users should upgrade to the latest version:

    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=app-admin/sudo-1.6.8_p9"

References
==========

  [ 1 ] Sudo Announcement
        http://www.sudo.ws/sudo/alerts/path_race.html

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

  http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200506-22.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@xxxxxxxxxx or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2005 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0


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For additional information or assistance, please contact the HELP Desk by 
telephone or Not Protectively Marked information may be sent via 
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On Call Duty Officer:
Tel: +44 (0) 870 487 0748 and follow the prompts

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UNIRAS wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Gentoo for the information 
contained in this Briefing. 
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Briefing contains the information released by the original author. Some 
of the information may have changed since it was released. If the vulnerability 
affects you, it may be prudent to retrieve the advisory from the canonical site 
to ensure that you receive the most current information concerning that problem.

Reference to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade 
name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply 
its endorsement, recommendation, or favouring by UNIRAS or NISCC.  The views 
and opinions of authors expressed within this notice shall not be used for 
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

Neither UNIRAS or NISCC shall also accept responsibility for any errors 
or omissions contained within this briefing notice. In particular, they shall 
not be liable for any loss or damage whatsoever, arising from or in connection 
with the usage of information contained within this notice.

UNIRAS is a member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) 
and has contacts with other international Incident Response Teams (IRTs) in 
order to foster cooperation and coordination in incident prevention, to prompt 
rapid reaction to incidents, and to promote information sharing amongst its 
members and the community at large. 
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<End of UNIRAS Briefing>

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