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UNIRAS Brief - 731/06 - Two Cisco Security Advisories:



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______________________________________________________________________________

 UNIRAS (UK Government CERT) Briefing - 731/06 dated 09.11.06 time 14:35
 UNIRAS is part of NISCC (the UK National Infrastructure Security
 Co-ordination Centre)
______________________________________________________________________________

 UNIRAS material is available from the NISCC website at www.niscc.gov.uk
______________________________________________________________________________

Title
=====

Two Cisco Security Advisories:

1. cisco-sa-20061108-csd - Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Secure Desktop

2. cisco-sr-20061108-openssl - Multiple Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL library

Detail
======

1. The Cisco Secure Desktop (CSD) seeks to minimize data from being left
behind after an SSL VPN session terminates. In particular, CSD works to
reduce, via encryption, the risk that cookies, browser history,
temporary files, and downloaded content remain on a system after a
remote user logs out or an SSL VPN session times out.

2. Two vulnerabilities have been uncovered by an ASN.1 test suite
developed by Dr. S. N. Henson. Both of these vulnerabilities, if
exploited, can cause denial of service. 



1.



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Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Cisco Secure Desktop

Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20061108-csd

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2006 November 08 1600 UTC (GMT)

- - -----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary
=======

Cisco Secure Desktop (CSD) software is affected by three
vulnerabilities that may:

  * Cause information produced and accessed during an Internet browsing
    session to be left behind on a computer after an SSL VPN session
    terminates.
  * Allow users to evade the system policy that prevents them from
    leaving the Secure Desktop while a VPN connection is active.
  * Allow local users to elevate their privileges.

Cisco has made free software available to address these vulnerabilities
for affected customers. There are workarounds available to mitigate the
effects of some of these vulnerabilities.

This advisory is posted at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20061108-csd.shtml.

Affected Products
=================

Vulnerable Products
+------------------

The vulnerabilities described in this document exist in versions
3.1.1.33 and earlier of Cisco Secure Desktop.

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------

Versions 3.1.1.45 and later of the Cisco Secure Desktop are not
affected by these vulnerabilities.

No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.

Details
=======

The Cisco Secure Desktop (CSD) seeks to minimize data from being left
behind after an SSL VPN session terminates. In particular, CSD works to
reduce, via encryption, the risk that cookies, browser history,
temporary files, and downloaded content remain on a system after a
remote user logs out or an SSL VPN session times out.

CSD is affected by the following vulnerabilities:

Information Leakage via Spawned Browser
+--------------------------------------

This vulnerability occurs when the Internet browser that is
automatically spawned to display a home page after an SSL VPN session
is established uses a directory outside of the vault maintained by CSD
to store its session information, i.e. browser cache (also known as
"temporary Internet files"), history, cookies, etc. This also allows
users to save files downloaded during this Internet browsing session to
outside of the CSD vault, which would result in unencrypted files
remaining in the system after the SSL VPN connection terminates.

Please note that this vulnerability only occurs when the Cisco SSL VPN
Client is configured to spawn a home page after a successful
connection. Spawning a home page after a successful connection is not
enabled by default.

This vulnerability is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCsg05935 - SVC's 
spawned browser saves to nonsecure desktop.

System Policy Evasion
+--------------------

This vulnerability allows users to switch between the Secure Desktop
and the Local (nonsecure) Desktop when using certain applications that
attempt to switch to the default desktop. This can occur even when the
system administrator has configured CSD to prevent switching between
the Secure Desktop and the Local Desktop.

This vulnerability is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCsg11636 - Applications 
that switch to the default desktop cause CSD to minimize.

Local Privilege Escalation
+-------------------------

The default permissions of the directory where CSD is installed, and
its parent directory, allow any user to modify the contents of a CSD
installation, including renaming, deleting and overwriting files.
Unprivileged users can make use of this to elevate their privilege and
obtain LocalSystem-equivalent privileges by replacing certain CSD
executables that are run as system services and with LocalSystem
privileges.

CSD is installed by default into the directory 
%SystemDrive%\Program Files\Cisco Systems\Secure Desktop\.

Note:  %SystemDrive% is a Microsoft Windows environment variable that
holds the drive that Windows was installed to. Normally, Windows is
installed in the first hard disk and therefore %SystemDrive% is usually C:.

Please note that there are other Cisco products that install their
files in a directory under %SystemDrive%\Program Files\Cisco Systems\.
When these products are installed they normally inherit the permissions
from the parent directory (%SystemDrive%\Program Files\Cisco Systems\).
Therefore, as a side effect of this vulnerability in CSD, other
products may be affected if they are installed after a vulnerable
version of CSD is installed.

This vulnerability is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCsg29650 - Insecure 
file and directory permissions in CSD installation.

For information about local system level privileges, please refer to:

  * LocalSystem Account
    http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/library/en-us/dllproc/base/localsystem_account.asp 

Impact
======

The "Information Leakage via Spawned Browser" vulnerability may cause
information produced and accessed during an Internet browsing session
to be left behind on a computer after an SSL VPN session terminates and
after CSD has attempted to clean up all traces of the data.

The "System Policy Evasion" vulnerability may allow users to access the
nonsecure desktop while the VPN connection is active, which is
something that the system administrator may have chosen to prevent via
a configuration option.

Successful exploitation of the "Local Privilege Escalation"
vulnerability may result in a normal user or attacker gaining full
control of the system, evading any controls put in place by the Windows
system administrator.

Software Version and Fixes
==========================

The vulnerabilities described in this document are fixed in version
3.1.1.45 of the Cisco Secure Desktop software.

Cisco Secure Desktop software can be downloaded from the following
location:

http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/securedesktop?psrtdcat20e2

Workarounds
===========

Information Leakage via Spawned Browser
+--------------------------------------

A workaround for this vulnerability is to disable the spawning of a
home page after a successful VPN connection. This setting is disabled
by default.

The setting that disables spawning of a home page after a successful
VPN connection is called "Restrict application usage to the web browser
only", which is disabled by default. This setting is found in the
"Secure Desktop Settings" page. For more information about this
setting, please visit the following URL:

http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6742/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00805f9f42.html#wp1041681

System Policy Evasion
+--------------------

There are no workarounds for this vulnerability.

Local Privilege Escalation
+-------------------------

A workaround for this vulnerability is to change the permissions of the
directory where CSD is installed, and all files under it, so only users
with administrative privileges can modify the contents of the CSD
installation. CSD is installed by default into the directory
%SystemDrive%\Program Files\Cisco Systems\Secure Desktop\.

The actual permissions that need to be set can be inherited from the
directory %SystemDrive%\Program Files\, which by default, have secure
permissions.

Changing directory permissions can be accomplished using the Windows
Explorer or using the CACLS.EXE command-line utility distributed with
modern versions of the Microsoft Windows operating system.

As mentioned in the Details section, if another Cisco product that
installs its files to its own directory under 
%SystemDrive%\Program Files\Cisco Systems\ is installed after a 
vulnerable version of CSD is installed, that other product may become 
affected as a side effect of the CSD vulnerability. Therefore, it is 
recommended to also fix permissions of directory and files of other 
Cisco products that have been installed after the installation of a 
vulnerable CSD version.

Please note that uninstalling CSD will remove the 
%SystemDrive%\Program Files\Cisco Systems\Secure Desktop\ directory, 
but will not remove nor change the permissions of the parent directory, 
i.e. %SystemDrive%\ Program Files\Cisco Systems\.

Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability
for affected customers. Prior to deploying software, customers should
consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature
set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise
using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms
of Cisco's software license terms found at 
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise 
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at 
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.

Do not contact either "psirt@xxxxxxxxx" or "security-alert@xxxxxxxxx"
for software upgrades.

Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.

Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.

Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: tac@xxxxxxxxx

Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades
for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.

Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================

The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerabilities and limitations described in this advisory.

The "Information Leakage Via Spawned Browser" and the "System Policy
Evasion" vulnerabilities were reported to Cisco by customers.

The "Local Privilege Escalation" vulnerability was reported to Cisco by
iDefense.

Cisco would like to thank them for working with us towards coordinated
disclosure of these vulnerabilities.

Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT
YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled
copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.

Distribution
============

This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20061108-csd.shtml

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

  * cust-security-announce@xxxxxxxxx
  * first-teams@xxxxxxxxx
  * bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  * vulnwatch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  * cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  * cisco-nsp@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  * full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History
================

+----------------------------------------+
| Revision |                  | Initial  |
| 1.0      | 2006-November-08 | public   |
|          |                  | release. |
+----------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security 
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at 
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

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All contents are Copyright 1992-2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved. 
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Updated: Nov 08, 2006                                Document ID: 72020

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2.


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Cisco Security Response: Multiple Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL library

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20061108-openssl.shtml

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2006 November 08 1600 UTC (GMT)

- - ---------------------------------------------------------------------

Cisco Response
==============

This is the Cisco PSIRT response to the multiple security advisories
published by The OpenSSL Project. The vulnerabilities are as follows:

  * RSA Signature Forgery (CVE-2006-4339), described in
    http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060905.txt
   
  * ASN.1 Denial of Service Attacks (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-2940),
    described in http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060928.txt 
   
  * SSL_get_shared_ciphers() buffer overflow (CVE-2006-3738), also in
    http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060928.txt leavingcisco.com
   
  * SSLv2 Client Crash (CVE-2006-4343), also in
    http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20060928.txt

As of this publication, there are no workarounds available for any of
these vulnerabilities, but it may be possible to mitigate some of the
exposure. This Security Response lists the status of each product or
application when considered individually. However, in cases where
multiple applications are running on the same computer, a
vulnerability in one application or component can compromise the
entire system. This compromise can then be leveraged against
applications that would otherwise be unaffected. Therefore, users
must consider all applications when determining their exposure to
these vulnerabilities. Cisco strongly recommends that customers
update all vulnerable applications and components to provide the
greatest protection from the listed vulnerabilities. Cisco will
update this document in the event of any changes.

Additional Information
======================

RSA Signature Forgery
+--------------------

During the CRYPTO 2006 conference, which was held August 20-24, 2006,
Daniel Bleichenbacher presented a method for forging RSA signatures.
The attack requires two conditions to be successful:

  * The keys use 3 (three) as one of the RSA exponents.
   
  * The signature verification algorithm has vulnerable
    implementation.

Notes describing this attack are at
http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/mail-archive/msg14307.html

The signature verification implementation vulnerability consists of
improper verification of PKCS-1 padded data. Any software with this
vulnerability might accept a forged signature, but only if the key
that is being forged has 3 (three) as one of the exponents.

ASN.1 Denial of Service Attacks
+------------------------------

Two vulnerabilities have been uncovered by an ASN.1 test suite
developed by Dr. S. N. Henson. Both of these vulnerabilities, if
exploited, can cause denial of service. The vulnerabilities are as
follows:

  * Parsing of certain invalid ASN.1 structures can result in an
    infinite loop that can consume system memory. This issue does not
    affect OpenSSL versions prior to 0.9.7. This is assigned CVE
    number CVE-2006-2937.
   
  * Specially crafted public keys can take a disproportionate amount
    of time to be processed. This is assigned CVE number
    CVE-2006-2940.

SSL_get_shared_ciphers() buffer overflow
+---------------------------------------

A specially crafted list of ciphers can be used to overrun a buffer.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE ID of CVE-2006-3738 and was
discovered by Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry from Google Security
Team.

SSLv2 Client Crash
+-----------------

SSL server can send malformed packet during SSLv2 connection
negotiation that can crash an SSL client. This vulnerability is
assigned CVE ID CVE-2006-4343.

Products Affected by OpenSSL Vulnerabilites
+------------------------------------------

Note: This is not a definitive list. Cisco continues to verify other
products and the list will be updated accordingly. The following
products are affected by the OpenSSL issues listed in this Security
Response:

  * Cisco Global Site Selector (GSS 4480, 4490, 4491, 4492) - Cisco
    bug ID is CSCsg22734. The fix is
    expected in the 2.0(1) release that is targeted for February
    2007.
   
  * Cisco MDS 9500 Multilayer Director - Cisco bug ID is
    CSCsg01963. Availability of fixed software has not been determined
    yet.
   
  * Cisco IDS - Cisco bug ID is CSCsg09619. Availability of fixed
    software has not been determined yet.
   
  * Cisco ONS 15454 - Cisco bug ID is CSCsg16571. The fix is contained
    in version 8.0 and later.
   
  * Cisco Access Registrar - Cisco bug ID is CSCsg17943. Availability
    of fixed software has not been determined yet.
   
  * Cisco Secure ACS - Cisco bug ID is CSCsg24311. Availability of
    fixed software has not been determined yet.
   
  * Cisco Security Agent - Cisco bug ID is CSCsg46092. Fixed libraries
    are provided by the hotfix 5.1.0.79. Other supported software
    releases will be updated in an upcoming releases.
   
  * Cisco Call Manager - Cisco bug IDs are CSCsg04397 and CSCsg04386.
    Only software releases 4.x and higher are affected. None of the
    previous releases are vulnerable. The fixes will be available in
    software release 5.1(1) currently targeted for 2006-Dec-11.
   
  * Cisco Unified Presence Server - Cisco bug ID CSCsg51110. Fixed
    software will be available in CUPS 1.0(3), currently targeted for
    2006-Nov-16.
   
  * Cisco Security MARS - Cisco bug ID is CSCsg51304. The fixes will
    be available in software release 4.2.3, which is expected in
    2006-December.
   
  * Cisco CSS 11500 Series Content Services Switches - Cisco bug ID is
    CSCek57074. Fixed software is available as releases 7.50.3.4S and
    8.10.2.6S.
   
  * Cisco Wireless LAN Controller - Cisco bug ID is CSCsg59589. The
    fixes will be available in upcoming software releases 4.0.x,
    targeted for 2006-Dec-18, and 3.2.x, targeted for 2007-January-31.
   
  * Cisco Application and Content Networking System (ACNS) - Cisco bug
    ID is CSCsf97055 and CSCsg55732. Availability of fixed software
    has not been determined yet.
   
  * Cisco Application Control Engine Module - Cisco bug ID is
    CSCsg36592. Availability of fixed software has not been determined
    yet.
   
  * Cisco Wide Area File Services Software (WAFS) - Cisco bug ID is
    CSCsg55738. Availability of fixed software has not been determined
    yet.
   
  * Cisco Wide Area Application Services (WAAS) Software - Cisco bug
    ID is CSCsg55742. Availability of fixed software has not been
    determined yet.
   
  * Cisco SIP Proxy Server - Cisco bug ID is CSCsg56292. Availability
    of fixed software has not been determined yet.
   
  * CiscoWorks Common Services - Cisco bug IDs are CSCsg58599 and
    CSCsg58607. Some Cisco management products integrate CiscoWorks
    Common Services into their general installation and runtime
    environments. To verify, navigate the path Server Configuration >
    About the Server > Applications and Versions in the CiscoWorks
    Server. Availability of fixed software has not been determined
    yet.
   
  * CiscoWorks Common Management Foundation (CMF was referred to as
    Common Services before the release of CiscoWorks 3.0) - Cisco bug
    ID is CSCsg58592. Some Cisco management products integrate
    CiscoWorks Common Services into their general installation and
    runtime environments. To verify, navigate the path Server
    Configuration > About the Server > Applications and Versions in
    the CiscoWorks Server. Availability of fixed software has not been
    determined yet.

Products Not Affected by OpenSSL Vulnerabilites
+----------------------------------------------

Note:  This list is not a definitive list. Cisco continues to verify
other products and the list will be updated accordingly. The
following products are confirmed not vulnerable.

  * Cisco IOS
   
  * Cisco IOS XR
   
  * Cisco IP Interoperability and Collaboration System (IPICS)
   
  * Cisco ASA/PIX/FWSM - While these products contain the OpenSSL
    libraries, they do not make use of the vulnerable code.
    Nonetheless, the software library has been updated to avoid any
    potential issues in the future.
   
      + For Cisco PIX/ASA, this is tracked by Cisco bug IDs
        CSCsg21727, CSCsg52606, CSCsg07425, and CSCsg07405. Software
        releases with updated libraries will be 6.3.6, 7.0.7,
        7.1.2.26, and 7.2.1.21 and later.
       
      + For Cisco FWSM, this is tracked by Cisco bug ID CSCsg52485,
        and the fixed libraries are expected in one of upcoming 3.1
        interim releases.

Workaround
==========

SSL is predominately used for securing HTTP traffic, but is also used
to secure other TCP traffic, such as SMTP, POP3, IMAP, and FTP.

Generally speaking, there is no workaround for these issues, but
mitigation is possible. By blocking affected protocols at the edge of
your network and by allowing only legitimate IP addresses to connect
to your devices, it is possible to lower your exposure to these
vulnerabilities.

Another option, which could reduce the security of your system, is to
revert to non-secure variants of the protocols. In that case, you
will not be affected by the vulnerabilities described here, but your
traffic will be sent in clear text and, if intercepted, an adversary
will be able to read it or even modify it while in transit.

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

Revision History
================

+----------------------------------------+
| Revision |                  | Initial  |
| 1.0      | 2006-November-08 | public   |
|          |                  | release. |
+----------------------------------------+

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco
security notices.  All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt

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______________________________________________________________________________

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______________________________________________________________________________

UNIRAS wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Cisco for the
information contained in this briefing.
______________________________________________________________________________

This notice contains information released by the original author.
Some of the information may have changed since it was released. If the
vulnerability affects you, it may be prudent to retrieve the advisory
from the site of the original source to ensure that you receive the most
current information concerning that problem.

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______________________________________________________________________________

<End of UNIRAS Briefing>

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