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UNIRAS Brief - 817/06 - OpenPKG Security Advisory: OpenPKG-SA-2006.038 - GNU tar



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______________________________________________________________________________

 UNIRAS (UK Government CERT) Briefing - 817/06 dated 11.12.06 time 13:40 
 UNIRAS is part of NISCC (the UK National Infrastructure Security
 Co-ordination Centre)
______________________________________________________________________________

 UNIRAS material is available from the NISCC website at www.niscc.gov.uk
______________________________________________________________________________

Title
=====

OpenPKG Security Advisory: OpenPKG-SA-2006.038 - GNU tar

Detail
======

The archive format utility GNU tar [0], versions up to and including
1.16, allows user-assisted attackers to overwrite arbitrary files
via a TAR format file that contains a "GNUTYPE_NAMES" record with
a symbolic link. As the "GNUTYPE_NAMES" based "name mangling"
functionality in TAR format files is (1) a GNU extension only, (2)
is no longer supported for TAR file creation by GNU tar since a
longer time and (3) the extraction of such records is too dangerous,
the functionality has been deactivated by default now in OpenPKG.
For backward compatibility (usually to extract already existing
older TAR format files), the introduced command-line option
"--allow-name-mangling" is available.


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____________________________________________________________________________

Publisher Name:          OpenPKG GmbH
Publisher Home:          http://openpkg.com/

Advisory Id (public):    OpenPKG-SA-2006.038
Advisory Type:           OpenPKG Security Advisory (SA)
Advisory Directory:      http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA
Advisory Document:       http://openpkg.com/go/OpenPKG-SA-2006.038
Advisory Published:      2006-12-08 17:40 UTC

Issue Id (internal):     OpenPKG-SI-20061127.01
Issue First Created:     2006-11-27
Issue Last Modified:     2006-12-08
Issue Revision:          06
____________________________________________________________________________

Subject Name:            GNU tar
Subject Summary:         archive format utility
Subject Home:            http://www.gnu.org/software/tar/
Subject Versions:        * <= 1.16

Vulnerability Id:        CVE-2006-6097, CVE-2002-1216
Vulnerability Scope:     global (not OpenPKG specific)

Attack Feasibility:      run-time
Attack Vector:           remote network
Attack Impact:           manipulation of data

Description:
    The archive format utility GNU tar [0], versions up to and including
    1.16, allows user-assisted attackers to overwrite arbitrary files
    via a TAR format file that contains a "GNUTYPE_NAMES" record with
    a symbolic link. As the "GNUTYPE_NAMES" based "name mangling"
    functionality in TAR format files is (1) a GNU extension only, (2)
    is no longer supported for TAR file creation by GNU tar since a
    longer time and (3) the extraction of such records is too dangerous,
    the functionality has been deactivated by default now in OpenPKG.
    For backward compatibility (usually to extract already existing
    older TAR format files), the introduced command-line option
    "--allow-name-mangling" is available.

References:
    [0] http://www.gnu.org/software/tar/ ____________________________________________________________________________

Primary Package Name:    tar
Primary Package Home:    http://openpkg.org/go/package/tar

Corrected Distribution:  Corrected Series: Corrected Package:
OpenPKG Enterprise       E1.0-SOLID        openpkg-E1.0.1-E1.0.1
OpenPKG Enterprise       E1.0-SOLID        tar-1.16-E1.0.1
____________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this document was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key of the OpenPKG GmbH (public key id 61B7AE34)
which you can download from http://openpkg.com/openpkg.com.pgp
or retrieve from the OpenPGP keyserver at hkp://pgp.openpkg.org/.
Follow the instructions at http://openpkg.com/security/signatures/
for more details on how to verify the integrity of this document.
____________________________________________________________________________

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UNIRAS wishes to acknowledge the contributions of OpenPKG for the
information contained in this briefing.
______________________________________________________________________________

This notice contains information released by the original author.
Some of the information may have changed since it was released. If the
vulnerability affects you, it may be prudent to retrieve the advisory
from the site of the original source to ensure that you receive the most
current information concerning that problem.

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<End of UNIRAS Briefing>

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